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Abstract 
Theories of morality maintain that punishment supports the emergence and 
maintenance of moral behavior. This study investigated developmental differences in the role 
of outcomes and the violator’s intentions in second-party punishment (where punishers are 
victims of a violation) and third-party punishment (where punishers are unaffected observers 
of a violation). Four hundred and forty-three adults and 8-, 12-, and 15-year-olds made 
choices in mini-ultimatum games and newly-developed mini-third-party punishment games 
(MTPP), which involved actual incentives rather than hypothetical decisions. Adults 
integrated outcomes and intentions in their second- and third-party punishment, whereas 8-
year-olds consistently based their punishment on the outcome of the violation. Adolescents 
integrated outcomes and intentions in second- but not third-party punishment.  
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Theories of morality suggest that norms are learned and upheld through positive (e.g., 
praise) or negative (i.e., punishment) reinforcement (Aronfreed, 1961; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
Henrich, 2004). People punish norm violations even when this incurs material costs for 
themselves, both in situations where punishers were the victim of a violation (second-party 
punishment) and situations where punishers were unaffected third-party observers (third-
party punishment; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). 
Like adults, children punish the norm violations of others (Furman & Masters, 1980). 
So far, developmental research has mainly studied children’s hypothetical and non-costly 
punishment judgments, but not costly punishment behavior (e.g., Leman & Björnberg, 2010; 
Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009). Since people’s judgments have been shown to 
strongly deviate from their actual behavior, particularly in moral contexts (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004), hypothetical punishment judgments are unlikely to be a 
good indicator of costly punishment. Studying punishment behavior in tasks with tangible 
outcomes thus provides more valid insights into the development of moral behavior. This 
contributes in a novel way to our understanding of how mechanisms supporting the 
emergence and maintenance of morality develop over human ontogeny and bridges research 
on morality from different disciplines (economics, biology, psychology). This study 
investigated, for the first time, (i) children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second- and third-party 
punishment behavior and (ii) developmental differences in the role of outcomes and 
intentions for second-and third-party punishment.  
The mini-ultimatum game (MUG; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003) assesses second-
party punishment of violations of fair-sharing norms. In one-shot MUG the proposer chooses 
between two fixed distributions that allocate resources (typically money) to him-/herself and 
an anonymous responder. For example, the proposer can choose between keeping eight coins 
and giving two to the responder (8/2 offer) or allocating five coins each (5/5 offer). If the 
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responder accepts the chosen distribution, the money is allocated accordingly. If the 
responder rejects, both players receive nothing. Responders’ rejections of positive offers have 
been interpreted as costly punishment, because they incur costs for both players.  
Third-party punishment has been studied in (repeated) social dilemmas where 
cooperation norms were violated (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002) and in allocations tasks where 
fairness norms were violated (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). The latter involve three 
persons. Person A allocates resources to Person B, who can only accept. After being 
informed of Person A’s allocation, Person C decides whether to punish Person A by spending 
some of his/her own endowment: For every unit Person C spends (e.g., one coin), Person A 
loses two units (e.g., two coins). Punishment in this game is costly, because both Person A 
and Person C end up with a smaller final payoff.  
Material outcomes, particularly the equality of the distribution, influence second- and 
third-party punishment. In ultimatum games, adults punished offers giving them less than 
20% of the resources about half of the time, but they accepted equal offers (Camerer, 2003; 
Güth & Tietz, 1990). Six- to 10-year-old (Sally & Hill, 2006) and 9- and 12-year-old (Sutter, 
2007) children also rejected unequal offers. In third-party punishment, about 60% of adults 
punished unequal offers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). The more unequal the offer, the more 
adults and children punished it (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Gummerum, Takezawa, & Keller, 
2009). These findings resonate with research showing that from middle childhood the 
majority of children make equal allocations (e.g., Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; 
Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa, & Mata, 2008; Shaw & Olsen, 2012) and regard equal 
allocations as morally right in anonymous sharing situations (Keller, Gummerum, Canz, 
Gigerenzer, & Takezawa, 2013). 
In addition to outcomes, responders’ perceived intentions of violators (i.e., accidental 
vs. deliberate violation) influence punishment. So far, the role of intentions in punishment has 
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only been investigated in second-party situations (Blount, 1995; Nelson, 2002). In MUG, 
juxtaposing a particular distribution option available to the proposer (e.g., a 8/2 offer) with 
alternative offers (e.g., 5/5 or 10/0) allows for examining intention-based punishment. Adults 
punished an unequal 8/2 offer less when the alternative, foregone offer was 10/0 (an even 
more unequal offer) than when the alternative offer was an equal split, suggesting that 
punishment was at least partly influenced by whether the fair-sharing norm was violated 
intentionally or unavoidably (Falk et al., 2003).  
Studies examining the role of intentions in children’s and adolescents’ second-party 
punishment produced mixed results. Sutter (2007) showed that 7- to 10-year-olds punish 
proposers based on intentions, but Güroğlu, van den Bos, and Crone (2009) found no 
evidence that 9-year-olds’ punishment of identical unequal offers vary with alternative offers. 
Both studies concur with research on children’s hypothetical punishment judgments: While 
preschool and elementary school children differentiated between intentional and accidental 
transgressions and well- and ill-intentioned actions, it is not until 10 years of age that children 
based their punishment judgments more strongly on violator’s intentions than outcomes 
(Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Karniol, 1978; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). 
We used the MUG and created a new game, the mini-third-party punishment game 
(MTPP), to measure children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second- and third-party punishment. 
Using the MTPP made it possible to assess the role of intentions and outcomes in children’s, 
adolescents’, and adults’ costly third-party punishment of unfair allocations for the first time. 
We expected more intention-based punishment in adolescents and adults than children. That 
is, adolescents and adults should be more likely than children to punish the default 8/2 offer 
more when the alternative offer was equal (5/5) or benefitted the receiver (2/8) than when the 
alternative offer was even more unfair (10/0). 
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Additionally, we investigated the time participants took to make their punishment 
decisions (i.e., response time, RT).  RTs reflect the relative difficulty with which decisions 
are made: “Easy” or dominant decisions produce shorter RTs than complex decisions for 
which a person has to override his/her dominant response (Lahat et al., 2012; Rubinstein, 
2007). If punishment is based on equality concerns, punishing the unequal default offer of 8/2 
should be equally difficult regardless of the alternative, foregone offers. Therefore, the RTs 
associated with punishment of the unequal default offer (8/2) should remain constant across 
different alternative offers. If participants consider the violator’s intentions, punishing the 8/2 
default offer when the foregone offer is even more unequal (i.e., a 10/0 offer) should be more 
difficult and thus associated with longer RTs than when the foregone offer is equal.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-eight 8-year-olds (Mage = 8.27 years, SD = 0.68; 49 females), 104 12-year-olds 
(Mage = 12.50 years, SD = 1.09; 54 females), 109 15-year-olds (Mage = 15.49 years, SD = 
0.52; 46 females), and 132 adult undergraduate students (Mage = 21.76 years, SD = 6.07; 104 
females) participated. Minors were recruited from primary and secondary schools serving 
middle-class communities in southern England.  
Procedure 
 Minors were tested in a quiet room at their school, adults in the laboratories of the 
authors’ university.  Up to six participants were seated at separate computer terminals and 
entered an identification code, their date of birth, and gender. Participants received 
instructions for both games and were told that the points distributed in these games would be 
converted into money (adults) or glow sticks (minors).
1
 For adults, each point was worth 
£0.50. Minors could earn one to five glow sticks. Participants’ final payoffs were determined 
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by matching one randomly selected decision in each game with the decision of an anonymous 
interaction partner. Participants could earn up to 15 points across the two tasks. 
 Participants answered two sets of quiz questions before each game (see Figure 1). 
MUG and MTPP were then played in counterbalanced order. Payoffs were distributed after 
all sessions were completed.  
Materials 
 Mini-ultimatum game (MUG) and mini-third-party punishment game (MTPP). 
The MUG is a sequential two-player game. Four subgames were presented in random order 
(Table 1). At Step 1, Person A decides between distribution option 1 and 2. For example, in 
Game[5/5], Person A was required to choose between the default Option 1 (8/2) and the 
alternative Option 2 (5/5). At Step 2, if Person B accepts the chosen distribution, points are 
distributed accordingly. If Person B rejects, neither player receives anything.  
The MTPP is a sequential three-player game. At Step 1, Person A chooses between 
two fixed distributions for him-/herself and Person B, who can only accept. At Step 2, Person 
C decides whether to spend any of their endowed 5 points. For every point spent, 2 points are 
deducted from Person A’s endowment. For example, if Person C spends 2 points, 4 points are 
deducted from Person A. The minimum points Person A can have is zero. Person B’s payoff 
is not affected by Person C’s decision. Four MTPP games, each with different fixed 
distributions at Step 1(Table 1), were presented in random order.   
About 10% of participants in each age group played the games as Persons A (8-year-
olds: n = 8; 12-year-olds: n = 9; 15-year-olds: n = 9; adults: n = 17) and made four choices 
per game, respectively. The strategy method (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004) was used to gain a 
comprehensive picture of punishers’ behaviors. Punishers were shown, one-at-a-time, the 
distribution options within each subgame and decided whether to punish Person A, thus 
making eight decisions in total. For example, in Game[2/8], responders/Persons C decided 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 1. Visual display of one set of quiz questions asked after the mini-ultimatum game (a) 
and mini-third-party punishment game (b) instructions. The left panels display the decision 
options available to Player A. Once participants press the “next” button, participants are 
presented with the right panels. The right panels display the option chosen by Player A. For 
the mini-ultimatum game, participants were then asked to indicate the correct number of 
points Person A and Person B would receive, if Person B accepted or rejected (a, right panel). 
For the mini-third-party punishment game, participants were presented with an example 
punishment decision of Person C and had to indicate the correct number of points for Persons 
A, B, and C Person B (b, right panel). Incorrect answers received an automatic prompt. After 
three such prompts participants received further instructions. 
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whether to punish the chosen offer of 8/2 when the foregone alternative was 2/8 and whether 
to punish the chosen offer of 2/8 when the foregone alternative was 8/2. 
Response-time measures. RTs were measured from the moment Person A’s decision 
was shown until the responder/Person C responded.  
 
Table 1 
Structure of Mini-Ultimatum Games and Step 1 of Mini-Third-Party Punishment Games 
Subgame 
 
Distribution options presented to Person A 
(points for Person A/points for Person B) 
Option 1 Option 2 
Game[10/0] 8/2 10/0 
Game[8/2] 8/2 8/2 
Game[5/5] 8/2 5/5 
Game[2/8] 8/2 2/8 
 
 
Results 
Analyses included only responders/Persons C who answered all quiz questions 
correctly (see Figures2, 3 for ns). Preliminary analyses showed no significant gender effects. 
Concerning the punishment of the default 8/2 offer in MUG, a significant interaction 
effect of Game × Age emerged, F(9, 332) = 2.54, p=.008, ηp
2 
= .03, which was followed up 
by repeated-measures ANOVAs separately for each age group. Adults, F(3, 111) = 20.58, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .16, 15-year-olds, F(3, 81) = 9.77, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .13, and 12-year-olds, F(3, 73) = 
6.35, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .08,  punished the 8/2 default more often in Game[5/5] and Game[2/8] 
than in Game[10/0] (all ps < .01). Twelve-year-olds and adults punished the default offer 
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a)  
 
(b) 
 
Figure 2.Proportion of second-party punishment of the default offer 8/2 (a) and the 
alternative offers (b) in the mini-ultimatum game by subgame and age. 
 
more in Game[5/5] than Game[2/8] (all ps < .01). Eight-year-olds punished the default offer 
to an equal degree across games (Figure 2a). Across ages, the default offer was punished 
significantly more often when the foregone offer was either 5/5 or 2/8 than when the 
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foregone offer was either 10/0 or 8/2, F(3, 332) = 26.46, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .08. Fifteen-year-olds 
punished the default offer more than participants of all other ages, F(3, 332) = 4.87, p=.003, 
ηp
2 
= .04. Concerning alternative offers, participants of all ages punished equal offers of 5/5 
and offers of 2/8 less than 8/2 and 10/0 offers, and 8/2 offers less than 10/0 offers, F(3, 332) 
= 331.66, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .51 (Figure 2b).  
 Concerning third-party punishment, we first assessed whether Persons C punished at 
all thereby treating responses as dichotomous (punishment, no punishment). A significant 
interaction effect of Game × Age emerged, F(9, 315) = 2.00, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .02. Separate 
repeated-measures ANOVAs showed that punishment of the default offer did not differ 
across games for the 8-, 12-, and 15-year-olds. Adults punished the default offer significantly 
more often when the foregone alternative was either 5/5 or 2/8 than when it was 10/0, F(3, 
90) = 5.92, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .06 (Figure 3a).Twelve-year-olds punished the default offer 8/2 
significantly less than all other age groups, F(3, 315) = 3.76, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .03. Concerning 
alternative offers, across ages participants punished offers of 5/5 less than 2/8 offers, and 2/8 
offers less than 10/0 or 8/2 offers, F(3, 315) = 47.41, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .13 (Figure 3b).  
Second, we examined how many points (0 to 5) Persons C spent to punish. 
Concerning the points invested to punish the 8/2 default offer, no significant effects with the 
variable game were found. Twelve-year-olds invested significantly fewer points than 8- and 
15-year-olds and adults, F(3, 315) = 8.34, p = .0001, ηp
2 
= .08. For alternative offers, the 
number of points invested differed significantly across games in all ages, with offers of 10/0 
receiving the largest and offers of 2/8 receiving the lowest amount of punishment, F(3, 315) 
= 100.87, p < .001, η2 = .25 (Table 2). Twelve-year-olds invested significantly fewer points 
to punish alternative offers than 8- and 15-year-olds and adults, F(3, 315) = 10.49, p = .0001, 
η2 = .09.  
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(b) 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of third-party punishment of the default offer 8/2 (a) and the alternative 
offers (b) in the mini-third-party punishment game by subgame and age. 
 
We also examined different individual behavior patterns in MUG and MTPP. Table 3 
shows the number of participants who only sanctioned zero offers, but did not punish positive 
offers (“punish selfishness”), participants who punished offers that gave Person B less than  
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Table 2 
Mean (and SD) Number of Points Invested by Person C to Punish Person A in Mini-Third-
Party Punishment Game by Game and Age 
Game Points invested in mini-third-party punishment game 
 8 years 12 years 15 years Adult 
Default offer 8/2 
Game[10/0] 
Game[8/2] 
Game[5/5] 
Game[2/8] 
1.65 (1.68) 
1.52 (1.53) 
1.56 (1.61) 
1.73 (1.66) 
0.96 (1.05) 
1.06 (1.19) 
1.00 (1.11) 
1.12 (0.89) 
1.76 (1.41) 
1.85 (1.37) 
1.75 (1.37) 
1.60 (1.31) 
1.17 (1.21) 
1.20 (1.33) 
1.55 (1.34) 
1.33 (1.23) 
Alternative offer 
Game[10/0] 
Game[8/2] 
Game[5/5] 
Game[2/8] 
2.11 (1.99)a 
1.57 (1.67)b 
1.32 (1.60)c 
0.73 (1.05)d 
1.46 (1.34)a 
0.89 (0.99)b 
0.46 (1.00)c 
0.42 (0.77)c 
2.45 (1.85)a 
1.71 (1.30)b 
0.69 (0.97)c 
0.55 (1.00)c 
2.13 (1.67)a 
1.29 (1.33)b 
0.40 (0.72)c 
0.34 (0.64)c 
abcd 
Means in columns not followed by a common letter subscript differ at p < .01 
(columnwise comparison; repeated-measures Analysis of Variance conducted separately for 
each age group). 
 
half but did not punish equal or advantageous offers (“punish inequality”), participants who 
only punished A when s/he forewent a kinder offer to B for a less generous one (“punish 
intentions”), and participants who always punished Person A. In MUG, children and 
adolescents punished inequality marginally more often than adults, χ2(3) = 6.55, p=.09. 
Fifteen-year-olds and adults punished intentions significantly more often than 9- and 12-year-
olds, χ2(3) = 16.03, p = .001. No developmental differences emerged for the other patterns. In 
MTTP, adults punished intentions significantly more frequently than children and 
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adolescents, χ2(3) = 7.84, p=.049. Children and adolescents punished selfishness marginally 
more often than adults, χ2(3) = 7.32, p =.06. No other developmental differences emerged. 
 
Table 3 
Frequencies (and Percent) of Individual Patterns of Punishment Behavior by Game and Age 
 Mini-ultimatum game Mini-third-party punishment game 
 
 
Pattern 
8  
years 
n = 37 
12 
years 
n = 36 
15 
years 
n = 43 
Adult 
 
n = 56 
8  
years 
n = 30 
12 
years 
n = 28 
15 
years 
n = 29 
Adult 
 
n = 28 
Punish 
selfishness 
11 
 (34%) 
6  
(18%) 
4  
(10%) 
8 
(15%) 
10 
(46%) 
7 
 (30%) 
8  
(36%) 
1 
(5%) 
Punish 
inequality 
16  
(50%) 
15 
(44%) 
19  
(48%) 
14  
(25%) 
8  
(41%) 
11 
(48%) 
13  
(59%) 
11 
(50%) 
Punish 
intentions 
5  
(16%) 
13 
(38%) 
17  
(43%) 
32 
(60%) 
3 
(25%) 
5 
(22%) 
1 
(5%) 
10 
(45%) 
Always  
punish 
5 
(14%) 
2  
(6%) 
3  
(7%) 
2  
(4%) 
9 
(30%) 
7 
(18%) 
7 
(24%) 
6 
(21%) 
  
For each age group, separate repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on the 
mean RTs associated with the decision to punish the default offer in MUG. Among 8-year-
olds, RTs did not differ significantly between games. RTs in game [10/0] were longer than in 
Game [5/5] in both 15-year-olds, F(3, 81) = 2.85, p=.04, ηp
2 
= .04 and adults, , F(3, 115) = 
3.29, p=.02, ηp
2 
= .04. RTs of 12-year-olds showed a similar pattern although this difference 
was only marginally significant, F(3, 78) = 2.12, p=.08, ηp
2 
= .03 (Table 4). 
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RTs associated with Person C’s decision to punish the default offer in MTPP did not 
differ across games for 8- and 15-year-olds. Among 12-year-olds, Person C’s punishment 
decision was associated with significantly longer RTs in Game[10/0] and Game[8/2] than in 
Game[5/5], F(3, 71) = 3.24, p=.02, η2 =.04. For adults, longer RTs emerged in Game[10/0] 
than in Game[5/5], F(3, 89) = 4.81, p =.003, η2 =.05 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4  
Mean Response Times (and SDs) Associated with the Punishment of the Default Offer 8/2 in 
the Mini-Ultimatum Game and the Mini-Third-Party Punishment Game by Subgame and Age 
(in Milliseconds) 
Subgame Age 
8 years 12 years 15 years Adult 
Mini-ultimatum game 
Game[10/0] 12,490 (8,657)a 8,031 (5,918)a 8,880 (7,659)a 8,153 (5,082)a 
Game[8/2] 13,289 (11,679)a 7,524 (4,522)a 7,528 (4,219) a,b 7,699 (4,742)a,b 
Game[5/5] 10,704 (8,696)a 6,364 (4,162) a 6,311 (3,202)a,b 6,674 (3,892)a.b 
Game[2/8] 12,067 (7,081)a 7,870 (4,966)a 7,507 (5,134)b 7,887 (5,641)b 
Mini-third-party punishment game 
Game[10/0] 14,731 (10,107)c 10,262 (6,724)c 9,695 (6,710)c 10,318 (5,337)c 
Game[8/2] 14,546 (11,669)c 10,476 (6,954)c 9,338 (4,794)c 10,793 (9,471)c,d 
Game[5/5] 12,909 (7,794)c 7,709 (4,043)c,d 8,019 (4,394)c 7,831 (4,131)c,d 
Game[2/8] 15,903 (11,818)c 9,629 (7,138)d 9,155 (4,892)c 9,968 (6,029)d 
abcd 
Means in columns not followed by a common letter subscript differ at p < .05 
(columnwise comparison; repeated-measures Analysis of Variance conducted separately for 
each age group). 
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Discussion 
Consistent with earlier research (e.g., Falk et al., 2003; Güroğlu et al., 2009; Sutter, 
2007), adults’ and adolescents’ second-party punishment in MUG was influenced by both 
concerns for outcomes and intentions: Although they punished unequal disadvantageous 
offers more than equal and advantageous offers, the default unequal 8/2 offer was punished 
less when the alternative foregone offer was as or more unequal than when it was equal or 
advantageous to the responder. Analyses of RTs showed that it was particularly hard for 
adults, 15-year-olds, and (marginally) 12-year-olds to decide whether to punish the 8/2 
default offer in Game[10/0], probably because choosing the unequal 8/2 offer in this game 
actually reflected the proposer’s friendly intentions. This pattern was not observed in 8-year-
olds. Thus, adolescents and adults were more likely to administer intention-based punishment 
than children.   
This is the first study that assessed the role of intentions and outcomes in costly third-
party punishment. Interventions on behalf of third parties are unlikely to be motivated by 
self-interest and thus show people’s commitment to norms (Vaish, Missana, &Tomasello, 
2011). Adults integrated Person A’s intentions and the fairness of the distribution in third-
party punishment. However, adults were more likely to punish inequality and less likely to 
punish intentions in third- compared to second-party situations. Furthermore, the amount of 
points adults spent punishing the default offer in MTPP did not differ with the foregone 
alternative. Children’s and adolescents’ third-party punishment was mainly based on the 
equality of the distribution rather than Person A’s intentions.  
What can account for these developmental and task differences in the influence of 
intentions on punishment? Radke, Güroğlu, and de Bruijn (2012) proposed a two-stage 
developmental model of decision-making in fairness situations.  At Stage 1, fairness is  
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conceptualized as inequity aversion and is based on social comparisons between one’s own 
and others’ outcomes. At Stage 2, people consider additional contextual information (e.g., 
intentionality) when pondering the fairness of a decision. This requires cognitive 
competencies, such as counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and mind-reading 
abilities, which develop from childhood to adolescence (Apperly, 2013; Choudhury, 
Blakemore, & Charman, 2006; Zelazo, Craik, & Booth, 2004).  These advanced cognitive 
abilities allow adults and adolescents, but not children, to incorporate intentionality 
information in their punishment. 
Why, then, are adolescents and adults more likely to consider the violators’ intentions 
in second- but not third-party punishment? First, integrating intentions into one’s third-party 
punishment requires punishers to simultaneously consider multiple perspectives from a third-
person point of view, an ability that emerges in mid-adolescence (Selman, 1980). Second, 
even when adolescents and adults have developed advanced perspective-taking skills, they 
struggle with employing these abilities for (sometimes routine) actions and decisions 
(Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Lin, Keysar and 
Epley (2010) showed that while adults had no difficulties in understanding others’ mental 
states, utilizing this knowledge in decision-making was effortful.  
While previous research has mainly focused on people’s punishment choices, this 
study additionally assessed RTs to study the underlying cognitive processes involved in 
punishment. The RT results indicate that even when the relevant cognitive abilities are at 
adult level, making intent-based punishment decisions was still effortful when outcome-
information conflicted with intention-information in Game[10/0].  RTs associated with 
punishing the 8/2 default offer in MTPP suggest that 12-year-olds take into account the 
violator’s intentions, whereas the analyses of their punishment decisions show that they do 
not consider intentions. These findings suggest a developmental lag between understanding 
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the role of intentions in punishment and actually administering intent-based punishment, 
probably because of the cognitive demands involved in intent-based punishment. They also 
highlight the importance of studying the development of punishment judgments, behavior and 
the processes underlying people’s decisions. 
In sum, because integrating intentions is more cognitively effortful and requires more 
advanced perspective-taking abilities in third- than second-party punishment, adolescents and 
adults might be less likely to consider intentions in the former than the latter situations. In 
future research, punishers could be asked to perform a concurrent second task that draws on 
advanced perspective-taking skills. This should lead to more outcome-based and less 
intention-based punishment even in adults (Lin et al., 2010). 
We found age effects in participants’ second- and third-party punishment, which 
converge, to some extent, with earlier research on adolescents’ punishment (Güroğlu et al., 
2009; Sutter, 2007). Specifically, 15-year-olds might be more likely to punish unequal offers, 
because, more than younger and older participants, they compare themselves and their 
payoffs to others and therefore are more attuned to equal outcomes (Dusek & McIntyre, 
2003). Whereas an increasing number of studies have examined the early emergence of 
fairness in young children (e.g., Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello; 2011), 
developmental psychological research on these concepts in adolescence is rather sparse. 
Therefore, a fruitful endeavor for future research would be to follow research in experimental 
economics (e.g., Martinsson, Nordbloom, Rützler, & Sutter, 2011; Sutter & Kocher, 2007) 
and examine fairness concerns, their relation to punishment decisions, and the developmental 
abilities underlying fairness and punishment across ontogeny.  
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Footnotes 
1
 Due to concerns by the university’s ethics committee as well as some participating 
schools, money could not be used as payment for minors. In addition to the analyses reported 
here, we conducted analyses separately for the adults and the minor samples, available upon 
request from the first author. 
